CATEGORIES

by Aristotle

translated by E. M. Edghill

1

Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a

common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for

each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to

the name 'animal'; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though

they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name

differs for each. For should any one define in what sense each is an

animal, his definition in the one case will be appropriate to that

case only.

On the other hand, things are said to be named 'univocally' which

have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common.

A man and an ox are both 'animal', and these are univocally so

named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is

the same in both cases: for if a man should state in what sense each

is an animal, the statement in the one case would be identical with

that in the other.

Things are said to be named 'derivatively', which derive their

name from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the

grammarian derives his name from the word 'grammar', and the

courageous man from the word 'courage'.