Bailouts and Systemic Insurance
нов 2013. · International Monetary Fund
E-knjiga
28
Stranica
reportOcene i recenzije nisu verifikovane Saznajte više
O ovoj e-knjizi
We revisit the link between bailouts and bank risk taking. The expectation of government support to failing banks creates moral hazard—increases bank risk taking. However, when a bank’s success depends on both its effort and the overall stability of the banking system, a government’s commitment to shield banks from contagion may increase their incentives to invest prudently and so reduce bank risk taking. This systemic insurance effect will be relatively more important when bailout rents are low and the risk of contagion (upon a bank failure) is high. The optimal policy may then be not to try to avoid bailouts, but to make them “effective”: associated with lower rents.
Ocenite ovu e-knjigu
Javite nam svoje mišljenje.
Informacije o čitanju
Pametni telefoni i tableti
Instalirajte aplikaciju Google Play knjige za Android i iPad/iPhone. Automatski se sinhronizuje sa nalogom i omogućava vam da čitate onlajn i oflajn gde god da se nalazite.
Laptopovi i računari
Možete da slušate audio-knjige kupljene na Google Play-u pomoću veb-pregledača na računaru.
E-čitači i drugi uređaji
Da biste čitali na uređajima koje koriste e-mastilo, kao što su Kobo e-čitači, treba da preuzmete fajl i prenesete ga na uređaj. Pratite detaljna uputstva iz centra za pomoć da biste preneli fajlove u podržane e-čitače.
