關於這本電子書
Focusing primarily on Plato, Aristotle, and the Pyrrhonian skeptics, Fine discusses the following questions, among others: does Socrates, in the Apology, claim to know that he knows nothing? How do Plato and Aristotle conceive of doxa and epistêmê? Are doxa and epistêmê belief and knowledge as we conceive of them nowadays? Do Plato and Aristotle allow us to have doxa of everything about which we can have epistêmê? How does Plato conceive of perception in the Phaedo and in Theaetetus 184-6? How should we understand his theory of recollection in the Phaedo? Do the Pyrrhonian skeptics disavow all beliefs? Do they have a conception of purely subjective experience? Do they take anything to be subjective? Are they external world skeptics? How do their views of subjectivity and skepticism compare with Descartes'? Taken as a whole, the essays explain why ancient epistemology is instructive and illuminating for us today.
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關於作者
Gail Fine received her BA from the University of Michigan in 1971, and her PhD from Harvard University in 1975. She also holds an MA from Oxford University (2009). She taught at Cornell University from 1975-2017; and was a Senior Research Fellow at Merton College, Oxford from 2007-2019. She is now Professor Emerita of Philosophy at Cornell University, and Senior Research Fellow Emerita at Merton College. Since 2007, she has been a Visiting Professor of Ancient Philosophy at Oxford University.
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