Hume and Contemporary Epistemology
Despre această carte electronică
- What does a Humean conception of knowledge look like?
- How do Hume’s understanding of belief and suspension of judgement bear on current debates about doxastic attitudes?
- Is there a Humean way of uniting reasons in the epistemic and practical domains?
- What is the proper role of reason at the foundations of ethics and epistemology from a Humean point of view?
- What contribution might an examination of Humean scepticism make to understanding of current sceptical hypotheses?
- Is Hume a hinge epistemologist?
- Does naturalized epistemology trace back to Hume?
- Does Hume have an ethics of belief?
- What can Hume contribute to virtue and vice epistemology?
Some chapters try to bring historically accurate interpretations of Hume’s ideas into contact with current issues, while others will take ideas merely suggested by Hume and demonstrate their philosophical usefulness. Together, they demonstrate Hume’s enduring relevance for debates about knowledge, belief, inquiry and suspension, reasons, modal knowledge, scepticism, hinge epistemology, naturalized epistemology, the ethics of belief and moral epistemology, virtue and vice epistemology, and the epistemology of testimony.
Hume and Contemporary Epistemology will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Hume, epistemology, and the history of philosophy.
Despre autor
Scott Stapleford is Professor of Philosophy at St. Thomas University in Fredericton, Canada. His publications for Routledge include Logic Works: A Rigorous Introduction to Formal Logic (with Lorne Falkenstein and Molly Kao, 2022), Hume’s Enquiry: Expanded and Explained (with Tyron Goldschmidt, 2021), Berkeley’s Principles: Expanded and Explained (with Tyron Goldschmidt, 2016), and three edited collections: Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles (with Kevin McCain and Matthias Steup, 2023), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (with Kevin McCain and Matthias Steup, 2021), and Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles (with Kevin McCain, 2020).
Verena Wagner is Professor of Philosophy of Mind at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany. She works at the intersection of philosophy of mind and epistemology, focusing on the nature of mental states and attitudes involved in the process of making up one’s mind, particularly the suspension of judgement. Her publications include Agnosticism as Settled Indecision (2022, Philosophical Studies), and two articles in Routledge collections: Epistemic Dilemma and Epistemic Conflict (2021) and Zetetic Seemings and Their Role in Inquiry (2023). She is co-editor of the Routledge collection Suspension in Epistemology and Beyond (with Alexandra Zinke, 2025).
