Infrastructure Privatization: Practical Effects of Non-compete Clauses and Economic Theories of Competition

· Kyle Mark Kirschling
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What is the purpose and effect of non-compete clauses in infrastructure privatization contracts? Can we expect infrastructure privatization to achieve efficiency gains when competition is barred? 

作者简介

Kyle M. Kirschling is an urbanist who specializes in improving cities’ infrastructure. He is a licensed CPA and holds a Master’s degree in Urban Planning from Columbia University. 

As an advisor to the New York City Transit Authority, he sped up subway trains (reversing a 23-year trend) by conceiving a new operations strategy, saving two to four minutes per train trip and increasing on-time performance from 67% to 81% in 12 months, at zero cost (includes the “Save Safe Seconds” campaign and “SPEED Unit,” as reported in The New Yorker, The New York Times, and elsewhere).

He is the author of “Engineering the New York City Subway,” the first publication to explain why New York City has a subway, and he is the author of "An Economic Analysis of Rapid Transit in New York, 1870-2010," an evaluation of the impact of private, public, and hybrid institutions for transit ownership and operation.

He presently runs an internal management consulting group at the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority focused on solving infrastructure maintenance and safety issues for the subway division.

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