Fall of the Double Eagle: The Battle for Galicia and the Demise of Austria-Hungary

In "The Fall of the Double Eagle," John R. Schindler draws on extensive archival research, memoirs, and diverse secondary sources in a dozen languages to explain how Austria-Hungary, despite military weakness and the inevitable consequences, consciously chose war in 1914. Through close examination of the Austro-Hungarian military, especially its elite General Staff, Schindler shows how even a war Vienna would likely lose appeared a preferable option to the "foul peace" the top generals loathed. The study considers how the polyglot empire was outgunned and unable to subdue Serbia, resulting in a humiliating defeat that generals sought to cover up. Worse was to come, when Austro-Hungarian divisions launched an offensive into Russian Poland in hopes of defeating the numerically superior enemy. By the time the Russians were halted at the gates of Cracow, over 400,000 Austro-Hungarian troops had been lost in just three weeks, a figure equal to the prewar standing army and a loss from which the empire would never recover. While Austria-Hungary's ultimate defeat and dissolution was postponed until the autumn of 1918, its fate was preordained in in the late summer of 1914 on the plains and hills of Galicia.