Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law

Name: Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law
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Christian Dahlman · Alex Stein · Giovanni Tuzet

2021年9月 · Oxford University Press

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Philosophy has a strong presence in evidence law and the nature of evidence is a highly debated topic in both general and social epistemology; legal theorists working in the evidence law area draw on different underlying philosophical theories of knowledge, inference and probability. Core evidentiary concepts and principles, such as the presumption of innocence, standards of proof, and others, reply on moral and political philosophy for their understanding and interpretation. Written by leading scholars across the globe, this volume brings together philosophical debates on the nature and function of evidence, proof, and law of evidence. It presents a cross-disciplinary overview of central issues in the theory and methodology of legal evidence and covers a wide range of contemporary debates on topics such as truth, proof, economics, gender, and race. The volume covers different theoretical approaches to legal evidence, including the Bayesian approach, scenario theory and inference to the best explanation. Divided in to five parts, Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law, covers different theoretical approaches to legal evidence, including the Bayesian approach, scenario theory and inference to the best explanation.

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關於作者

Christian Dahlman is Professor of Jurisprudence at Lund University (Sweden) and holds the Samuel Pufendorf chair at the Faculty of Law. He has a PhD in philosophy of law from Lund University and his academic career includes a research fellowship at Cambridge University. His main area of research is the theory and methodology of legal evidence. He is the director of the cross-disciplinary research group LEVIC (Law, Evidence and Cognition) at Lund University. Alex Stein is a Justice of the Israel Supreme Court. He holds a Ph.D. in law from the University of London. Prior to his appointment to the bench, he served as a Professor of Law at the Hebrew University, Cardozo Law School and Brooklyn Law School and as a Visiting Professor of Law at Columbia, Harvard and Yale law schools, among others. His areas of research include Evidence, Legal Theory, and Economic Analysis of Law. Giovanni Tuzet is Professor of Philosophy of Law at Bocconi University in Milan (Italy). He studied law and philosophy in Turin and Paris and wrote his Ph.D. dissertation on C.S. Peirce's theory of inference. Before joining Bocconi University, he was a post-doctoral researcher at Lausanne (Switzerland) and Ferrara (Italy). His areas of interest include evidence, epistemology, pragmatism, argumentation theory, philosophy of law and economic analysis of law.