The history of American military operations in the post-Vietnam era has been marked by failure and near-disaster. Since 1970, American forces have been committed in five operations—in Sontay to rescue prisoners, in Cambodia on behalf of the crew of the SS Mayaguez, in Iran to rescue the American hostages, in Beirut, and in Grenada. In each case they have failed.
Gabriel tells how and why each of these operations was crippled by faulty intelligence, clumsy execution, or poor planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Much of his information was still classified by the Pentagon when it was revealed in this book for the first time.
Richard A. Gabriel, professor of politics at St. Anselm College in Manchester, N.H., served twenty-two years as an active intelligence officer, much of it spent at the Directorate of Foreign Intelligence in the Pentagon. A consultant to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, he is the author of numerous books on military subjects, including Operation Peace for Galilee and Crisis in Command (with Paul Savage).