Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles

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This volume presents new research on the epistemology of seemings. It features original essays by leading epistemologists on the nature and epistemic import of seemings and intuitions.

Seemings and intuitions are often appealed to in philosophical theorizing. In fact, epistemological theories such as phenomenal conservatism and dogmatism give pride of place to seemings. Such views insist that seemings are of central importance to theories of epistemic justification. However, there are many questions about seemings that have yet to be answered satisfactorily. What kinds of seemings are there? How do seemings justify? Are seemings connected to truth? Do they play a significant role in inquiry? The chapters in this volume offer a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas about seemings, the nature of justification and evidential support, intuitions, inquiry, and the nature of inference.

Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology and philosophy of mind.

關於作者

Kevin McCain is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. He has authored and edited several works in epistemology and philosophy of science including the following from Routledge: Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification (2014), Epistemology: 50 Puzzles, Paradoxes, and Thought Experiments (2021), What is Scientific Knowledge? An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology of Science (with Kostas Kampourakis, 2019), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles (with Scott Stapleford, 2020), and Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (with Scott Stapleford and Matthias Steup, 2021).

Scott Stapleford is Professor of Philosophy at St. Thomas University in Fredericton, Canada. His publications for Routledge include Logic Works: A Rigorous Introduction to Formal Logic (with Lorne Falkenstein and Molly Kao, 2022), Hume’s Enquiry: Expanded and Explained (with Tyron Goldschmidt, 2021), Berkeley’s Principles: Expanded and Explained (with Tyron Goldschmidt, 2016), and two edited collections: Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (with Kevin McCain and Matthias Steup, 2021) and Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles (with Kevin McCain, 2020).

Matthias Steup received his PhD from Brown University in 1985. He is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder, and the author of An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (1996) and numerous articles in epistemology. He is the editor of Knowledge, Truth and Duty (2001) and co-editor of Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2005, 2014), A Companion to Epistemology (2010), and Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (Routledge, 2021).

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