Value, Obligation, and Meta-ethics
Jan 1995 · Value Inquiry Book Series Ibhuku elingu-30 · Rodopi
I-Ebook
319
Amakhasi
family_home
Kufanelekile
info
reportIzilinganiso nezibuyekezo aziqinisekisiwe Funda Kabanzi
Mayelana nale ebook
This work defends an interrelated set of theses in value-theory, normative ethics and meta-ethics. The three Parts correspond to these three areas.
Part One (Value) defends a biocentric theory of moral standing, and then the coherence and objectivity of belief in intrinsic value, despite recent objections. Intrinsic value is located in the flourishing of living creatures; specifically, a neo-Aristotelian, species-relative account is supplied of wellbeing or flourishing, in terms of the development of the essential capacities of one's species. There follows a theory of priorities, or of relative intrinsic value, in which the satisfaction of basic needs takes priority over other needs and over wants, and the interests of complex and sophisticated creatures over those of others, where they are at stake.
Part Two defends a practice-consequentialist theory of the criteria of rightness and of obligation, which leaves room for supererogation, underpins our intuitions about justice, commends population growth only where it is genuinely desirable, and responds better than act-consequentialism to objections like that concerned with the separateness of persons. Part Three sifts meta-ethical theories, rejects moral relativism, and defends a cognitivist and naturalist meta-ethic. In defending analytical naturalism, it takes into account the latest literature on supervenience.
By responding to recent discussions, this study supersedes my Theory of Value and Obligation (1987). It is equipped with detailed end-notes and an ample bibliography, which could prove a research tool of itself.
Part One (Value) defends a biocentric theory of moral standing, and then the coherence and objectivity of belief in intrinsic value, despite recent objections. Intrinsic value is located in the flourishing of living creatures; specifically, a neo-Aristotelian, species-relative account is supplied of wellbeing or flourishing, in terms of the development of the essential capacities of one's species. There follows a theory of priorities, or of relative intrinsic value, in which the satisfaction of basic needs takes priority over other needs and over wants, and the interests of complex and sophisticated creatures over those of others, where they are at stake.
Part Two defends a practice-consequentialist theory of the criteria of rightness and of obligation, which leaves room for supererogation, underpins our intuitions about justice, commends population growth only where it is genuinely desirable, and responds better than act-consequentialism to objections like that concerned with the separateness of persons. Part Three sifts meta-ethical theories, rejects moral relativism, and defends a cognitivist and naturalist meta-ethic. In defending analytical naturalism, it takes into account the latest literature on supervenience.
By responding to recent discussions, this study supersedes my Theory of Value and Obligation (1987). It is equipped with detailed end-notes and an ample bibliography, which could prove a research tool of itself.
Nikeza le ebook isilinganiso
Sitshele ukuthi ucabangani.
Ulwazi lokufunda
Amasmathifoni namathebulethi
Faka uhlelo lokusebenza lwe-Google Play Amabhuku lwe-Android ne-iPad/iPhone. Livunyelaniswa ngokuzenzakalela ne-akhawunti yakho liphinde likuvumele ukuthi ufunde uxhunywe ku-inthanethi noma ungaxhunyiwe noma ngabe ukuphi.
Amakhompyutha aphathekayo namakhompyutha
Ungalalela ama-audiobook athengwe ku-Google Play usebenzisa isiphequluli sewebhu sekhompuyutha yakho.
Ama-eReaders namanye amadivayisi
Ukuze ufunde kumadivayisi e-e-ink afana ne-Kobo eReaders, uzodinga ukudawuniloda ifayela futhi ulidlulisele kudivayisi yakho. Landela imiyalelo Yesikhungo Sosizo eningiliziwe ukuze udlulise amafayela kuma-eReader asekelwayo.
