On Learning and Ethics: Philosophy, Knowledge and Normativity

The meaning of a concept, object, proposition or meta-theory lies in the mediations and negotiations we undertake in the world. This formulation does not deny the existence of a referent, as some semantic theorists are inclined to do. What it does is distinguish between an unknowable world and the way we can perceive or come to know that world. This positions the truth-value of a linguistic utterance or proposition about a concept, object, object-configuration, object-relation or person in mind-world and world-mind relationships.

The book provides for a distinctive understanding of the concepts of learning and ethics, and the relationships between them, and it develops a unifying framework for their overarching contribution to social theory. It addresses one of the key issues of our times, that of the relationship between learning and ethics, an issue that is neglected in the field of social ontology.

The audience for this book is the global scholarly and philosophical community. The book avoids being narrowly focused on one particular discipline or area of knowledge. A secondary audience is students in the English-speaking parts of the world focusing their studies on these philosophical matters.